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AMERICAN SHIP BLDG. v. NLRB
of the case. 4 Furthermore, the information was certainly material
to the witness's credibility.55 But the majority, placing themselves
in the position of the triers of the facts, speculated that the jury would
have attached little significance to the withheld evidence. Under the
circumstances, this would appear to have been an incorrect basis of
decision."O*
Unlocking The Lockout
American Ship Bldg. v. NLRB1
On June 6, 1961, collective bargaining began between the
American Ship Building Company and eight unions, but the employ-
ment contract expiration date, August 1, was reached with agreement
still not in sight. The unions proposed that the existing contract be
extended six months or in the alternative that it be extended indefinitely
with terms of the new contract to be retroactive to August 1. Under
either proposal, the unions would have had the prerogative of striking
at whatever time appeared most damaging to the company, while
still working under the security of the provisions of the old contract.
The nature of the employer's business in this case made the unions'
proposals particularly unacceptable. The American Ship Building
Company is engaged in the repair of Great Lakes vessels and operates
its yards at peak capacity during the winter months, when shipping
54. Id. at 479, 212 A.2d at 113. See also 3 WIGMORn, op. cit. supra note 53,
§ 979, at 537 (3d ed. 1940), which concludes:
There is however one situation in which an exception should be recognized, in
spite of these reasons of policy, viz., where the witness is a woman-complainant
on a charge of sex-offense. To ascertain such a witness's veracity without an
inquiry into her life-history is psychologically impossible, for her testimonial
trustworthiness is often linked inseparably with her other traits. These cannot
be ascertained without considering specific acts of her past behavior.
55. Ibid. See also note 10 supra. The dissent cited 3 WIGMoRr, op. cit. supra
note 53, § 934(a) (3d ed. 1940) :
Occasionally is found in women complainants, testifying to sex-offences by
men, a dangerous form of abnormal mentality - dangerous here, because it affects
testimonial trustworthiness while not affecting other mental operations. It con-
sists in a disposition to fabricate irresponsibly charges of sex-offences against
persons totally innocent. . . . Sometimes it is associated with unchaste conduct
in the witness, sometimes not. But its nature is well known to psychiatrists and
is recognizable by them. Testimony to its existence in an individual should always
be receivable.
56. See notes 8 & 9 supra and accompanying text.
* EDITOR's No'rt: Certiorari has been granted by the U.S. Supreme Court,
34 U.S.L. W4EK 3317 (March 22, 1966).
1. 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
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is curtailed by the freezing of the Lakes. Had the company continued
to operate, it would have been under the constant threat of a strike
which could have occurred at any time, and it was unwilling to assume
such a disadvantageous bargaining position. Instead, it began laying
off its employees on August 11, 1961.
The unions filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board
alleging that this laying off or locking out of employees was an unfair
labor practice under sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3) of the National
Labor Relations Act.2 The trial examiner, the finder of fact, determined
that since each of the five previous agreements had been preceded by
a strike, the company had reasonable cause to fear that a strike was
imminent.3 He sustained the company's actions, basing his decision
on a line of cases which held that an employer may lock out his
employees in anticipation of an imminent strike in order to avoid
severe economic damage.4 The National Labor Relations Board's
interpretation of the facts, contrary to that of the trial examiner, was
that the American Ship Building Company did not have reasonable
cause to believe that a strike was imminent. 5 Consequently, the NLRB
ruled that the company's action did not fit into one of the lawful
categories of lockouts.6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the issue of whether an
employer commits an unfair labor practice when he locks out his
employees for the purpose of exerting economic pressure on the
unions during contract negotiations.' The Court ruled that a lockout
for the sole purpose of persuading the unions and the employees to
accept the employer's bargaining position is a permissible economic
weapon available to an employer after an impasse has been reached
2. 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1965), states:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title . . .
(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage mem-
bership in any labor organization.
Similarly, 49 Stat. 452 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1965), states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to
refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent that such right may
be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment.
3. 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, at 1376, 53 L.R.R.M. 1245 (1963).
4. Id. at 1382, referring, inter alia, to: Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130
N.L.R.B. 1122, 47 L.R.R.M. 1455 (1961) ; Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268,
28 L.R.R.M. 1509 (1951); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335, 12 L.R.R.M.
151 (1943).
5. Id. at 1363. The Board was upheld in a brief per curiam opinion by the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals. Local 374, Boilermakers Union v. NLRB, 331 F.2d
839 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
6. Id. at 1364.
7. 379 U.S. 814 (1964).
8. An impasse has been said to occur when "there was no further reasonable
prospect of reaching agreement . . ." NLRB v. Intracoastal Terminal, Inc., 286 F.2d
954, 958 (5th Cir. 1961).
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in collective bargaining, 9 and that the lockout used by the American
Ship Building Company was not an unfair labor practice.
In the past the use of lockouts by employers has been strictly
regulated by the National Labor Relations Board. The Board
generally maintained that a lockout was presumptively illegal.1" Many
Board rulings indicated that the burden of proof required of Board
attorneys in a lockout case was merely to show that the lockout had
occurred." Upon this showing, absent a defense, the employer was
guilty of an unfair labor practice under sections 8 (a) ( 1 ) and 8 (a) (3)
of the National Labor Relations Act and was liable for the back pay
of his employees for the duration of the lockout. The financial risk
an employer took in locking out his employees therefore was extreme.
An accurate statement of the Board's position is found in the
Quaker State Oil Refining Corporation case :12
[A]bsent special circumstances, an employer may not during
bargaining negotiations either threaten to lock out or lock out
his employees in aid of his bargaining position. Such conduct
the Board has held presumptively infringes upon the collective-
bargaining rights of employees in violation of Section 8(a)(1)
and the lockout, with its consequent layoff, amounts to dis-
crimination within the meaning of Section 8(a) (3). In addition,
the Board has held that such conduct subjects the Union and the
employees it represents to unwarranted and illegal pressure and
creates an atmosphere in which the free opportunity for negotia-
tions contemplated by Section 8(a) (5) does not exist.'"
However, the Board had given some consideration to employer in-
terests and had accepted two defenses to its general prohibition of
lockouts. One of these exceptions was where a strike or intermittent
9. 380 U.S. at 310-11, 318.
10. The following statement is typical of the Board's position:
To lay off (lock out) employees, or otherwise to reduce their earnings because
they have [made demands through their union representative for better terms],
operates as a restraint upon the free exercise of that right [Section 7 rights
(29 U.S.C. § 157, supra note 2)], and hence constitutes at the very least, a
prima facie violation of Section 8(a) (1) ; that violation is an unquestionable one
where no basis appears for the lockout other than a coercive purpose to force,
while negotiations are still in progress, abandonment of the Union's demands and
acceptance instead of the contract term proposed by the employer.
Dalton Brick & Tile Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 473, 482-83, 45 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1960),
enforcement denied, 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962). See also Morand Brothers Beverage
Co., 99 N.L.R.B. 1448, 30 L.R.R.M. 1178 (1952).
11. The Board placed lockouts in that category of employer conduct which so
seriously interferes with lawful concerted activities of employees that it is unnecessary
to make a finding of employer motivation. This policy has been approved by the
Supreme Court in regards to other types of employer conduct. See, e.g., NLRB v.
Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963) and Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17 (1954).
12. 121 N.L.R.B. 334, 42 L.R.R.M. 1343 (1958), enforced, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959).
13. 121 N.L.R.B. at 337.
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work stoppage 4 was imminent and would cause the employer eco-
nomic loss due to spoilage of goods 5 or hardship to customers.'
The other defense was a lockout in retaliation against the use of a
whipsaw strike.' A whipsaw strike is a strike against one member of
a multiemployer bargaining association. Unions have made profitable
use of the classic "divide and conquer" principle, for an employer is
far more willing to agree to union demands when he is paralyzed by
a walkout while his competitors are freely operating. Customers once
lost are difficult to regain, and an employer can suffer fatal injury if
he does not reach quick agreement with the union. After the first
employer gives in, the union is free to act against the remaining em-
ployers one at a time. In order to maintain a collective front comparable
to that of the employees', employer associations have made agreements
which provide that if one member is struck, the others will close ranks
behind their struck member by shutting down and locking out their
employees. The power is then more in balance, and the union is forced
to absorb the cost and pressure of a major, over-all strike. The Board
has held that this defensive action by a multiemployer association is
justifiable and that the association may act to preserve its existence.
The Board announced its position in the case of Buffalo Linen Supply
Co.,"' the only previous lockout case which has gone to the Supreme
Court. The Buffalo Linen decision, however, was confined to the
multiemployer units - the whipsaw strike situation - and estab-
lished the legality of the lockout only in that particular circumstance.' 9
The Supreme Court decided another multiemployer lockout case,
Labor Board v. Brown,"° the same day American Ship Building was
decided. In that case one grocery store in a bargaining association
was struck, and the other stores locked out their employees in accord-
ance with prior agreements. The significant difference from the
Buffalo Linen situation was that all the employers, by using super-
14. International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907. 27 L.R.R.M. 1504 (1951).
15. Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335, 12 L.R.R.M. 151 (1943).
16. Packard Bell Electronics Corp., 130 N.L.R.B. 1122, 47 L.R.R.M. 1455 (1961)(tie-up of customers' television sets) ; Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 268,
28 L.R.R.M. 1509 (1951) (tie-up of customers' automobiles).
17. Buffalo Linen Supply Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 34 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1954),
enforcement denied, sub nor. Truck Drivers Union v. NLRB, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir.
1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 87 (1957) ; Publishers' Ass'n of New York City, 139 N.L.R.B.
1092, 51 L.R.R.M. 1434 (1962), aff'd sub nom. New York Mailers' Union No. 6 v.
NLRB, 327 F.2d 292 (2d Cir. 1964).
18. 109 N.L.R.B. 447, 34 L.R.R.M. 1355 (1954).
19. Buffalo Linen can be said, however, to stand for the broader principle of
accommodation of conflicting legitimate interests of employers and of employees, for
the Court stated, 353 U.S. at 96:
Although the Act protects the right of employees to strike in support of their
demands, this protection is not so absolute as to deny self-help by employers when
legitimate interests of employees and employers collide. Conflict may arise, for
example, between the right to strike and the interest of small employers in pre-
serving multiemployer bargaining as a means of bargaining on an equal basis
with a large union and avoiding the competitive disadvantages resulting from
nonuniform contractual terms. The ultimate problem is the balancing of conflicting
legitimate interest.
See also NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
20. NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
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visors, relatives and temporary help, continued to operate their stores. 21
The Supreme Court, in holding that such action was lawful, further
strengthened the employer's arsenal in time of economic warfare.22
The Board's general prohibition of bargaining lockouts has not
stood unchallenged. The leading case in opposition to the Board's
theory was that of Dalton Brick and Tile Company v. NLRB, decided
by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.2 3 After an impasse had been
reached in bargaining, the company, because of its marginal financial
condition, locked out its employees. Factors leading the company to
declare a lockout included the need to reduce the period of exposure
to unpredictable but retroactive wage increases, probable embarrassment
with its customers, and the need for resolution of the issue imme-
diately, rather than in the midst of peak operations. The Board ruled
that the purpose of the lockout was to enhance the company's bargaining
position by exerting further pressure on the union to accept the com-
pany's terms.24 The Fifth Circuit agreed that this was the company's
primary purpose,25 but the court disagreed that the matter could be
analyzed on the basis of prima facie illegality, saying "to begin with,
the Act does not outlaw the lockout."2 Realizing the need for bal-
ancing the interests of employees against those of the employer, the
court was constrained to abandon the per se approach:
[I]t is our view that each case must be carefully measured by
its own setting. But in that process our approach is certainly not
one in which the employer starts with a presumptive burden of
illegality which must somehow be overcome. Nor is the so-called
employer justification limited to those factors which might be
described as economic hardship.27
Some of the other circuits, however, upheld the view of the
Board.2' The Supreme Court in American Ship Building resolved
the conflict among the circuits by agreeing with the Dalton Brick and
Tile decision and rejecting the arguments advanced by the Board in
21. The Board's theory was that only the struck store could continue its opera-
tions. See NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), where the
Supreme Court held that a struck employer could continue to operate his business by
employing permanent replacement for his striking workers.
22. In Brown, as in American Ship Building, the Supreme Court required the
Board to point to independent evidence that the lockout was motivated by anti-union
animus. Brown, 380 U.S. at 288; American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at 313. See also
Textile Workers v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1965), decided the
same day, where the Court also gave the Board instructions as to making a finding
of employer anti-union motivation.
23. 126 N.L.R.B. 473, 45 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1960), enforcement denied, 301 F.2d
886 (5th Cir. 1962).
24. 126 N.L.R.B. 473.
25. 301 F.2d at 892.
26. Ibid.
27. Id. at 894.
28. For cases upholding the Board, see, e.g.: Body and Tank Corp. v. NLRB,
339 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1964); Boilermakers Union v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839 (D.C. Cir.
1964) ; Utah Plumbing and Heating Contractors Ass'n v. NLRB, 294 F.2d 165 (10th
Cir. 1961); Quaker State Oil Refining Corp. v. NLRB, 270 F.2d 40 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 361 U.S. 917 (1959). Compare, NLRB v. Dalton Brick and Tile Corp.,
301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962); Leonard v. NLRB, 205 F.2d 355 (9th Cir. 1953);
Morand Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1953).
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prohibiting virtually all lockouts as a matter of law. 29 The Court could
find no indication in the Board's allegations or in the evidence that the
company was trying to frustrate the process of collective bargaining
or that it was trying to prevent its employees from organizing for
the purpose of collective bargaining. Nor did the Court believe that the
"lockout will necessarily destroy the unions' capacity for effective and
responsible representation. ' 3 ' The Court found that the company's
purpose was only to resist and to modify the unions' bargaining de-
mands and that support of a bargaining position is not to be equated
with hostility to the collective bargaining process.3
The Board, in pursuing its theory that the lockout was disruptive
of collective bargaining rights, also argued that it destroyed another
important and, in the Board's view, absolute right of the employees:
the right to strike.3 2 According to the Board, the company had inter-
fered with this right by closing down the plant and leaving the employees
with nothing to strike.3 3 The effectiveness of the right to strike was
thereby impaired, because the union no longer had sole control over
the timing of the economic confrontation. 4 The Board's theory would
thus leave the company with two alternatives - to accede to union
demands or to resist in the hope that it could survive a probable strike.
The Court termed the Board's argument "wholly specious" because
the work stoppage, which would necessarily be the object of a strike,
had already occurred. The court stated, "The right to strike . . . is
the right to cease work - nothing more.' 35  It noted that nowhere
in the National Labor Relations Act can be found the proposition that
the right to strike includes the unhampered right to control the
timing and duration of work stoppages.3 "
The Board further contended, as it had in the past, that this sort
of lockout was a per se violation of section 8(a) (3) of the act,
prohibiting discrimination in regard to hire, tenure or other conditions
of employment which discourages union membership, because it was
employer conduct so destructive of employee organizational interests
that no proof of an anti-union motivation was required. When pressed
to explain how the discrimination and discouragement of union member-
ship would occur, the Board reasoned that the employees would attribute
their loss of pay to the union's persistent demands and would thereby
be discouraged from supporting and maintaining membership in the
union. 7 The Court made it clear that without positive proof of anti-
29. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
30. 380 U.S. at 309.
31. Id. at 308-09.
32. See statutes cited in note 2 supra. See also 49 Stat. 457 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 163 (1965) : "Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided
for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in
any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
33. For a previous statement of this theory see Dalton Brick and Tile Co., 126
N.L.R.B. 473, at 482-83, 45 L.R.R.M. 1337 (1960).
34. Brief for Board, p. 15.
35. 380 U.S. at 310.
36. Ibid. "The pedestrian need not wait to be struck before leaping for the curb."
Betts Cadillac-Olds, Inc.; 96 N.L.R.B. 268, 286, 28 L.R.R.M. 1509 (1951).
37. See Dalton Brick & Tile Co., 126 N.L.R.B. 473, at 482-83, 45 L.R.R.M. 1337
(1960).
[VOL. XXVI
AMERICAN SHIP BLDG. V. NLRB
union animus, a bargaining lockout could not be a violation of the
act."8 In this case the only intent shown was that the company wanted
to settle the dispute to its advantage.
It was also "the Board's judgment . . . that the interest of the
employer in being free of the ordinary hazards of a strike is outweighed
by the interest of employees in being free to use the strike weapon at
a time of their choosing."39 The Board claimed that it was within its
province of competence and expertise to balance the competing interests
of employers and employees,4" and specifically to determine that the
lockout was an overly powerful economic weapon which would upset
this balance. According to the Board,4 the employer was sufficiently
armed, since he had such weapons as the right to permanently replace
striking workers42 and the right to institute changes on his own
initiative after collective bargaining had failed to bring agreement.43
If the union and the employer cannot agree on certain terms of the
bargaining agreement and an impasse is reached, then the employer
may put into operation his final proposals to the union. He may not,
however, institute changes that exceed those final proposals. The
Board further numbered among the employer's weapons the stock-
piling of inventories and the transferral of orders to other plants.
The Court acknowledged the deference due the Board's special
competence. However, it asserted that the Board was exceeding its
authority in "balancing the competing interests of labor and manage-
ment," for it was then attempting to pronounce national labor policy.44
"The deference owed to an expert tribunal cannot be allowed to slip
into a judicial inertia which results in the unauthorized assumption
by an agency of major policy decisions properly made by Congress.""
Justice White in his concurring opinion did not believe that the
Board had acted beyond its scope of authority, nor did he believe that
it was essential to show employer motivation to establish a violation
of the act.46 His ground for reversal was the Board's failure to
articulate "a rational connection between the facts found and the
decision made." 47
Justice Goldberg, joined by Chief Justice Warren, also could
not accept the majority's broad ruling. The former General Counsel
of the United Steelworkers of America agreed that the lockout was
38. 380 U.S. at 313. See supra note 22.
39. Brief for Board, p. 25.
40. See Justice White's concurring opinion in American Ship Building, 380 U.S. at323-27. See also Koretz, The Lockout Rezisited, 7 SYvAcust L. Rev. 263, 269 (1956).
41. Brief for Board, pp. 24-26.
42. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
43. NLRB v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1963).
44. 380 U.S. at 315-17. See NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477 (1960).
45. Id. at 318. But Congress has failed to make the necessary policy decisions in
this area, and it has fallen upon the Court to do so. See 60 L.R.R.M. 24, at 27-29(1965), reporting the recent speech given by Clyde W. Summers. See also Summers,
Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALi L.J. 59, 82-88 (1965).
46. Id. at 326-27. See NLRB v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 438 (1965),
where the court remanded a bargaining unit determination of the Board because the
Board had failed to articulate sufficiently the reasons for its decision.
47. Id. at 326.
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lawful, but he would have found so on the same basis as the trial
examiner - that there was reasonable cause to believe that a strike
was imminent and that such a strike would cause considerable economic
damage to the company and its customers." Justice Goldberg stated
that this area is too complex to be analyzed by a general formula. He
maintained that a case by case treatment must be used because of the
numerous factual diversities that are presented by different lockouts. 49
The Sixth Circuit, the first court to decide a lockout case5° in the
light of American Ship Building and Labor Board v. Brown, declared a
lockout legal where there was no joint contract between two Detroit
newspapers and the striking union. The facts indicated a multi-
employer bargaining interest, since the two papers had common in-
terests in regard to the striking union; one was closely following the
other's progress in contract negotiations; and the union had overtly
indicated that similar demands in regard to the major issues would
be made of both papers.5 ' The court, in deciding that the lockout was
lawful, referred to the broadened scope of legal lockouts as a result of
American Ship Building: "While in American Ship Building there
was an impasse in the negotiations between the employer and the union,
we do not think the teaching of that case merely adds another exception
to the Board's category of permissible lockouts." 52 The court seems to
say that a pre-impasse lockout is legal, something that the Supreme
Court expressly refused to rule upon. The court took this approach
when it could have decided the case by extending the multiemployer
doctrine to include this situation.
48. Id. at 327.
49. Id. at 336-39.
50. Detroit Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 346 F.2d 527 (6th Cir. 1965),
reversing 145 N.L.R.B. 996, 55 L.R.R.M. 1091 (1964). The Court of Appeals of the
District of Columbia in a short per curiam opinion did modify an earlier decision to
conform with Brown. The Court of Appeals, faced with a fact situation quite similar
to that in Brown, reserved its decision until Brown was decided. The court held that
the members of the multiemployer bargaining unit could engage "in a lockout while
continuing to operate their establishments." The employers had locked out in response
to a whipsaw strike. Retail Clerks Union v. NLRB, 348 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
For other subsequent court cases see NLRB v. Tonkin Corp., 352 F.2d 509 (9th Cir.
1965) and NLRB v. Golden State Bottling Co., 353 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1965).
51. 346 F.2d at 529-30.
52. Id. at 530. A further question is whether the scope of the legal lockout
includes a situation where two unions, which are parties to multiemployer bargaining
agreements, in breach of those agreements refuse to cross the picket line of a striking
union that represents employees of employer A only, and employer B then locks
out his employees to put pressure on the two unions to go back to work at employer
A's place of business.
These were the facts presented in The Hearst Corp., N.L.R.B. Case No. 5-CA-
3116, et seq. (November 22, 1965), a case involving the two major Baltimore dailies,
the News-American and the Sunpapers, presented before an N.L.R.B. trial examiner.
The Daily Record, December 11, 1965, p. 2, col. 1. The Sun was originally struck by
the Guild, a union which did not represent any employees of the News-American.
The Printers and Teamsters, each of which had joint contracts with the two news-
papers, refused to cross the Guild's picket line. The refusal to work by the Printers
and the Teamsters, and not the Guild strike, caused The Sun to shut down. According
to agreement, the News-American terminated its operation in support of The Sun.
Both papers contended that the Printers and Teamsters were breaking their respective
joint contracts, and the trial examiner agreed, supporting the lockout as permissible
in this case. The American Ship Building decision was not discussed, however.
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Brown and American Ship Building have made a significant
adjustment in the balance of power in labor relations. In the area of
collective bargaining, the employer has had few positive means for
resisting union demands. In fact, he has had no method of initiating the
offensive except in the narrow area of lockouts justified by economic
necessity. The Board claimed that the scales were already balanced
because the employer had the right to replace striking workers, to
implement unilateral changes after an impasse had been reached in
bargaining, to stockpile inventories, and to transfer orders to other
plants. These are clearly defensive weapons. Now the employer has
the potential of using a truly offensive weapon in bargaining. He can
lock out his employees before they strike. He, too, can decide the
timing of the work stoppage.
How far will he be able to further reinforce his lockout? It seems
possible, reading the two decisions together, that a single employer
could lock out his employees and continue to operate his business.
If a multiemployer unit can continue to operate with temporary
replacements, as the Court held in Brown, why should the right of
continued operations be denied the single employer? The Supreme
Court, however, refused to consider this point." The Brown case
could be distinguished by arguing that the multiemployer unit needs
the additional leverage of continued operations, because its objective in
locking out is to secure the continuation of the multiemployer bar-
gaining unit,54 not better bargaining terms for the particular employer
who is struck. But better bargaining terms are the very purpose of
multiemployer bargaining association and are the logical outcome of
the continuation of the association.
In order for a lockout to have any practical value in many situa-
tions, it would have to be complemented with the replacement right.
Where the current labor market will provide sufficient replacements
for the employer to continue his operations in the event of a work
stoppage, he would be wiser to forego his right to a lockout if he
does not also have the right to replace. He could more economically
exert pressure towards acceptance of his bargaining position through re-
placement of his employees in the event of a strike than he could by
temporarily shutting down his operations.
The answer to the question of how the lockout will be further
strengthened may be found in the Court's allocation of the burden of
proof in these cases. The method of adjudicating the employer's
duties and liabilities in lockout cases has been altered so that the
employer is no longer guilty until he proves himself innocent. The
53. See 380 U.S. 300, at 339 n.8.
54. A recent decision of the Board has added another obstacle to the preservation
of the multiemployer bargaining unit. The Detroit newspapers once again were en-
deavoring to continue multiemployer bargaining. The Pressmen's Union refused to
continue this method of bargaining. The Board found the employers guilty of a
refusal to bargain because the employers, after an unsuccessful attempt to discuss
continuation of the multiemployer unit with the union, would not bargain with the
union on an individual basis. Evening News Association, 154 N.L.R.B. No. 121,
60 L.R.R.M. 1149 (1965) ; 154 N.L.R.B. No. 123, 60 L.R.R.M. 1154 (1965).
1966]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Board now must show proof of the employer's anti-union motivation
to sustain a violation. In the first two lockout cases decided by the
Board after American Ship Building, specific findings were made that
the employer had an anti-union motivation, and the lockouts were
therefore held to be illegal. 51
Justice White took the Court's warning to the Board, that it require
a showing of motivation, to be absolute. To him this meant that where
there is no finding of motivation, there can be no violation. He stated,
"If the Court means what it says today, an employer may not only
lockout after an impasse. .. , but replace his locked-out employees with
temporary help, cf. Labor Board v. Brown, ante, p. 278, or perhaps
permanent replacements, and also lock out long before an impasse is
reached."56
Perhaps Justice White believed that the Court had eliminated
from its judicial repertoire that category of employer conduct which is
so destructive of employee rights that an analysis of motivation is not
required and is not relevant because the harm to employee rights is
so great. But the Court expressly recognized in its opinion the con-
tinued existence of this category,57 and thereby reserved a sound basis
for deciding the issue posed by a lockout long before an impasse has
been reached. As to the employer who utilizes a bargaining lockout
and replaces his employees temporarily or permanently, the Court,
according to what it believes to be the requirements of sound labor
relations policy at the time, will place that conduct either in the cate-
gory of activity requiring proof of motivation or in the category of
conduct not permitted regardless of motivation. The Court must
continue to balance the conflicting legitimate interests of employers
and of employees in order to further the objectives of national labor
policy and "to promote the full flow of commerce." 8
55. Hi-way Dispatch, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 22, 59 L.R.R.M. 1447 (1965)(lay-offs were not motivated by a desire to conserve cash in the face of a strike, but
were designed to coerce employees into abandoning their grievance) ; Joseph Weinstein
Electric Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 3, 59 L.R.R.M. 1015 (1965) (repeated expressions
of hostility toward union, attempts to persuade employees to affiliate with rival union,
and proposals that employees enter agreement with him in disregard of the union).
For three later cases where the Board did not find a violation, see Weyerhauser Co.,
155 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 60 L.R.R.M. 1425 (1965), Topeka Grocers Management Ass'n,
155 N.L.R.B. No. 79, 60 L.R.R.M. 1428 (1965), and particularly, Acme Markets, Inc.,
156 N.L.R.B. No. 127, 61 L.R.R.M. 1281 (1966).
56. Justice White's concurring opinion, 380 U.S. 318, at 324. See Getman,
Section 8(a)(3) of the N.L.R.A. and the Effort to Insulate Free Employee Choice,
32 U. CHI. L. Rev. 735, 749 (1965).
57. 380 U.S. at 311-12. See also note 11 supra.
58. 61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1965). For other articles on the general
subject see: Duvin, The Bargaining Lockout: An Impatient Warrior, 40 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 137 (1965) ; Duvin, The Duty to Bargain: Law in Search of Policy, 64 COLUM.
L. REv. 248 (1964); Forkosch, Bargaining and Economic Pressure - The New
Trilogy, 16 LAB. L.J. 232 (1965); Koretz, Legality of the Lockout, 4 SYRACUsE L.
Rev. 251 (1951) ; Koretz, Lockout Revisited, 7 SYRcusE L. REv. 263 (1956);
Meltzer, Lockouts Under the LMRA: New Shadows on an Old Terrain, 28 U. CHI.
L. Rev. 614 (1961) ; Meltzer, Single Employer and Multiemployer Lockouts Under
the Taft-Hartley Act, 24 U. CHI. L. Rev. 70 (1956) ; Oberer, Lockouts and the Law:
The Impact of American Ship Building and Brown Food, 51 CORNELL L.Q. 193
(1966) ; Summers, Labor Law in the Supreme Court: 1964 Term, 75 YALE L.J.
59 (1965).
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